Uber Surge Prices, Part III
I wrote twice previously about Uber jacking up prices in an emergency in Sydney, Australia (I, II). In both cases, I have pointed out that in addition to it being rational for many (and perhaps even the majority) to prefer non-surging in emergencies, it's also totally plausible aggregate utility, measured in conventional ways, is maximized by not surging. This is true even if increasing prices causes significant supply increases (which nobody has demonstrated happens in snap emergencies like these). The reason people miss this is because their Econ 101 reasoning ignores the way diminishing marginal utility and inequality disrupt the analysis. Here, I want to give one last push to that with a concrete example.
Suppose that, in a given location, 10 people will normally hail an Uber cab, and 10 drivers will normally be cruising about to accept them. Now suppose that, because of an emergency, the number of people trying to hail a cab shoots to 100 people. In response, Uber jacks up prices very high, which has the effect of bringing 10 additional drivers on to the road. That means there are now 20 drivers (a doubling of supply) and 20 of the 100 people trying to hail an Uber cab succeeds in doing so.
Under Econ 101 analysis, you say that there was a welfare increase here. See, there were 20 people who got Uber cabs rather than 10 people. But, as I keep pointing out, this argument is not determinative if we assume the 100 people vying for Uber cabs have unequal economic resources. Further, the more unequal the resources are among those people, the more likely using prices like this actually decreases aggregate utility.
To see why, consider these two scenarios:
Non-Surge
- Rider Demand: 100
- Cab Supply: 10
- Chance of Getting a Cab: 10% for all 100 riders
- Rider Demand: 100
- Cab Supply: 20
- Chance of Getting a Cab: 100% for wealthiest 20 riders, 0% for other 80 riders